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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and 
budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European countries (CESEE) in 
comparison with other OECD countries. CESEE countries tend to grow faster and have more 
volatile output than non-CESEE OECD countries, which has implications for macroeconomic 
management: better fiscal and monetary institutions are needed to avoid pro-cyclical policies. 
The paper develops a Budgetary Discipline Index to assess whether good fiscal institutions 
underpin good fiscal outcomes. Even though most CESEE countries have low scores, the 
debt/GDP ratios declined before the crisis. This was largely the consequence of a very 
favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the interest rate, but such a 
favourable relationship is not expected in the future. Econometric estimations confirm that 
better monetary institutions reduce macroeconomic volatility and that countries with better 
budgetary procedures have better fiscal outcomes. All these factors call for improved 
monetary institutions, stronger fiscal rules and better budgetary procedures in CESEE 
countries. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to identify the major institutional determinants of macroeconomic 
stability and aggregate budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European 
(CESEE) countries.1 The region grew fast before the crisis, but the crisis hit most of these 
countries hard – more so than any other country group of the world – and the recovery from 
the crisis is also generally slow. As a consequence, the pre-crisis seemingly smooth economic 
progress and good budgetary record suddenly came to an end. 
Have fiscal2 and monetary institutions played important roles in macroeconomic stability 
and aggregate budgetary control? Since the crisis had a decisive impact on both 
macroeconomic stability and budgetary control, the impact of these institutions on the build-
up of pre-crisis vulnerabilities and on crisis response has a crucial relevance to this question. 
This paper defines fiscal institutions as a set of arrangements directing budgetary preparation 
(including expenditure frameworks and fiscal rules), approval and execution. Monetary 
institutions are associated with the exchange rate regime, the quality of financial regulation 
and supervision, the independence of central banks, and the transparency of central bank 
decision making. Causal links from fiscal and monetary institutions to budgetary control and 
macroeconomic stability can be hypothesised as follows: 
• Fiscal institutions and macroeconomic stability: Countries with better fiscal 
frameworks are presumably following counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Letting 
automatic stabilisers run and implementing counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal 
policy through the business cycle can dampen macroeconomic volatility. 
• Fiscal institutions and budgetary control: Better fiscal institutions can directly lead to 
better budgetary outcomes (i.e. low deficit or surplus, and low public debt) by 
constraining fiscal policy. 
• Monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability: The ultimate goal of monetary 
policy should be the stabilisation of the economy through the business cycle, and 
better monetary institutions should be more successful in achieving this goal. 
Monetary institutions are defined broadly, and the role of financial stability is 
considered through regulation and supervision. The crisis has proven even more 
clearly that financial stability has strong implications for macroeconomic stability. 
• Monetary institutions and budgetary control: There should not be a direct causal link 
from monetary institutions to budgetary control. However, the indirect channel 
through a higher level of macroeconomic stability can work. 
                                                     
1. This paper analyses 26 countries of central, eastern and south-eastern Europe: 12 central European and 
Baltic members of the EU (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), the six European CIS countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine), five non-EU countries of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), and Albania, Georgia and Turkey. 
 The information in this paper with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is 
no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the 
context of the United Nations, Turkey will preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”. 
2. For the purposes of this paper, “budgetary” and “fiscal” have the same meaning. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes macroeconomic stability and 
budgetary outcomes. Budgetary institutions are assessed in Section 3: the “Budgetary 
Discipline Index” deviates from similar indices in the literature as it considers a set of 
institutional features that focus specifically on budgetary discipline. Section 4 discusses 
monetary institutions. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis on the impact of fiscal and 
monetary institutions on macroeconomic stability and budgetary control. Section 6 presents 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Macroeconomic stability and fiscal outcomes 
2.1. Development of GDP 
Most of the CESEE countries (except Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) went through a 
historically unprecedented transition from socialist political systems towards democracies and 
from centrally planned economies towards market economies. The extraordinarily deep 
recession after the collapse of the communist regimes was followed by a fast and apparently 
smooth economic recovery – that is, growth of per capita GDP has well exceeded the growth 
in the CESEE region’s main trading partners (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (EU15=100), 1980-2010 
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Note: Countries are ranked according to their 2010 forecast values. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and EBRD 
database on main macroeconomic indicators. 
Figure 1 also indicates that the duration of the recession in the 1990s (the transition 
period) varied substantially across CESEE countries, which complicates the selection of a 
start date for the sample period for the econometric analysis in this study. The current global 
financial and economic crisis complicates the selection of the end date of the sample period. 
Figure 1 indicates that the recovery has halted in several CESEE countries and even reversed 
in some of them. Quarterly GDP indicators also show that recovery from the crisis is in 
general slow in CESEE countries and much slower than in other emerging country groups 
(Figure 2). For example, in the six small and open Asian economies shown in Panel A of 
Figure 2, output growth is currently faster than it was before the crisis, implying that these 
countries may converge to their pre-crisis trend line. But in CESEE countries, the speed of 
recovery so far falls behind pre-crisis growth, even though there is heterogeneity: Albania and 
Poland have not suffered from a recession in 2009, while in Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Ukraine the drop in output was close to or even above 20%. 
 
Figure 2. Quarterly GDP developments (2008Q3=100), 2005Q1-2010Q4 
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Panel B. CESEE countries 
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Notes: Country group averages in panel A are non-weighted averages. Asia-6: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. Latin America-8: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru 
and Uruguay. CESEE-21: the average of the 21 countries shown in Panel B. OECD non-CESEE: 27 OECD 
countries except Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. 
Sources: Eurostat (EU countries and Croatia), OECD (other OECD countries and Russian Federation), and 
national statistical offices, IMF and EBRD quarterly GDP database (other countries). Whenever seasonally 
adjusted series were not available, the Census X-12 method for seasonal adjustment was used. 
The reasons behind both the more serious average impact of the crisis on CESEE 
countries and the diversity among those countries have been studied (see, for example, Mitra, 
Selowsky and Zalduendo, 2009; Darvas, 2010; and Becker et al., 2010), so only the main 
issues are summarised here. 
The pre-crisis development model pursued by CESEE countries had many special 
features compared to other emerging economies. It was based on deep political, institutional, 
financial and trade integration with the EU3 which was also accompanied by substantial 
                                                     
3. There are also differences within the CESEE region, however. The new EU member states have reached the 
highest level of integration, followed by the countries of the western Balkans and Turkey that have the status 
of either EU candidate or potential candidate. The six Eastern Partnership countries, which were part of the 
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labour mobility into EU15 countries. Other emerging country regions did not have an anchor 
similar to the role the EU played for CESEE countries. Economic growth in the CESEE 
region relied on net private capital inflows, which have reached higher levels than elsewhere. 
In the aftermath of the dramatic crises in Asia and Latin America in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the CESEE region was the only emerging region of the world that had persistent 
current account deficits. Economic recovery was accompanied by real exchange rate 
appreciations – again a largely unique feature of the CESEE development model – and real 
interest rates fell. 
But the CESEE development model had two important variants within the region. Some 
countries, most notably countries in central Europe, were more successful in making use of 
the development model. In these countries, pre-crisis growth was accompanied by small and 
even improving trade balances, as a reflection of reindustrialisation after the collapse that 
followed the fall of communist regimes. In most of the other countries, however, the trade and 
current account balances deteriorated sharply before the crisis, reaching double-digit levels in 
several cases. As a consequence, external debt rose fast before the crisis. Also, housing prices 
rose much faster and real exchange rate appreciation was also more rapid, while real interest 
rates fell to lower levels than in central European countries and inflation also rose 
considerably before the crisis. All of these factors suggest that economic growth in this group 
of countries was to a considerable extent fuelled by unsustainable booms. Indeed, there was 
extremely rapid growth of credit to the private sector, and the composition of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) was also biased in favour of banking, real estate and other domestic sectors. 
When the crisis started, most people thought that the CESEE region would not be hit too 
hard. For example, the April 2008 Regional Economic Outlook Europe of the IMF foresaw 
that “emerging Europe’s convergence trend is set to continue, based on good fundamentals, 
although its pace is likely to slow” (IMF, 2008), and other institutions and commentators 
shared this view. However, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was a sudden 
interruption, and even reversal in some countries, of capital inflows to CESEE countries. This 
led to a credit crunch which, combined with the subsequent export and investment declines, 
has depressed economic activity. Commodity exporters, such as Azerbaijan, the Russian 
Federation or Ukraine, were also hit by falling commodity prices. As the crisis unfolded, the 
credit crunch was replaced by falling demand for credit, caused by increased uncertainty and 
lowered expectations with respect to future growth prospects (Ghosh, 2009). 
The diversity of responses to the crisis within the CESEE region could be related to 
different reliance on pre-crisis capital inflows, trade and commodity exports. But the crisis 
responses have likely been influenced by the fiscal and monetary policies during the crisis: 
only a few CESEE countries (e.g. Azerbaijan, Czech Republic, Poland, Russian Federation, 
Slovenia, and Turkey) implemented fiscal stimulus in order to dampen the crisis. Most other 
countries had to consolidate public finances, thereby likely amplifying the downturn (Darvas, 
2010).4 Furthermore, monetary policy could not be eased at a time when capital was moving 
out, and indeed several countries had to raise interest rates as well. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Soviet Union, have reached varying degrees of integration with the EU15, and the Russian Federation still 
remains an important anchor for these countries. 
4. The appendix table in Darvas (2010) details the fiscal measures taken by CESEE countries in response to the 
crisis. 
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2.2. Macroeconomic stability 
Two measures of macroeconomic stability are used for the econometric analysis of 
Section 5 below: 
• volatility of GDP growth rates, 2000-10 
• output decline in 2009 
The first one can be regarded as an average measure of stability, while the second can be 
regarded as a “tail” event. The selection of these measures is based on the following: 
The developments described in the previous sub-section suggest that considering the pre-
crisis period only would be misleading, since pre-crisis economic growth has led to economic 
structures that made CESEE countries more prone to the crisis. In particular, the seemingly 
fast and smooth growth before the crisis has led to vulnerabilities in several CESEE countries, 
which eventually resulted in huge output falls and slow recoveries so far. Therefore, the crisis 
should be included in the sample. On the other hand, the 1990s was burdened with so many 
structural changes that the inclusion of this sample period would not be informative. 
Therefore, whenever data availability allows, the sample period of 2000-10 is used when 
studying macroeconomic stability, but a pre-crisis sample period (2000-07) is also used for 
comparison. 
Macroeconomic stability has various interpretations.5 The focus here is on GDP volatility, 
which of course can also reflect internal and external disequilibrium. Ideally, GDP volatility 
should be measured as the volatility of the deviation from potential output. However, 
measures of potential output are especially uncertain for countries like those of central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe and at the time of the global crisis. An example is given in 
Figure 3 which depicts the 2007 output gap in EU member CESEE countries as seen at 
different dates, using data from the European Commission. The figure shows huge revisions 
in potential output calculations. The EC first published forecasts for the 2007 output gap in 
autumn 2005, when it predicted, for example, that the output gap of Latvia in 2007 would be -
0.7%. This forecast was maintained in the spring of 2006, but later it was substantially revised 
upward. In the spring of 2008, the 2007 output gap was seen as 4.8% and in autumn 2009 it 
was seen as 16.3%. Therefore, we do not study the volatility of the output gap, but 
concentrate on GDP growth. 
 
                                                     
5. At the broadest level, macroeconomic stability can be defined as the volatility of output. It could also be 
defined, for example, as the level and volatility of inflation (representing internal equilibrium in the 
economy) or the level and volatility of the current account balance (representing external equilibrium). 
However, the assessment of both internal and external equilibrium is complicated by the economic 
developments of CESEE countries. 
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Figure 3. The 2007 output gap as seen at different dates 
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Source: European Commission forecasts made at the dates indicated on the horizontal axis. 
Figure 4 shows the standard deviation of real GDP growth rates in 2000-07 and in 2000-
10 in order to assess the possible increase in volatility in response to the crisis. Indeed, 
considering the pre-crisis period of 2000-07, volatility was seemingly low in several CESEE 
countries. In some cases, volatility was even below the average of non-CESEE OECD 
countries. However, data for 2000-10 suggest that the seemingly low pre-crisis volatility has 
indeed masked underlying vulnerabilities. In some cases, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Ukraine, the rise in volatility is quite dramatic. On the other hand, there are four countries 
(Albania, Belarus, Cyprus and Poland) where volatility is below the non-CESEE OECD 
average in the 2000-10 period. 
Figure 4. Standard deviation of annual GDP growth rates 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010. 
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2.3. Fiscal outcomes 
Two measures of fiscal outcomes are used for the econometric analysis of Section 5 
below: 
• average general government balance (as a per cent of GDP) in 2000-10 
• change in general government gross debt (as a per cent of GDP) from 2000 to 2010 
The two measures are related, but not perfectly, as will be demonstrated below. The 
second measure considers the change in the debt/GDP ratio (as opposed to the level of the 
debt/GDP ratio) because good fiscal institutions in a given year cannot impact the inherited 
stock of debt, but can impact the change in debt. Of course, the econometric analysis controls 
for the initial level of debt and other potential determinants. Similarly to the study of 
macroeconomic stability, the pre-crisis period (2000-07) is also used for comparison to the 
preferred sample of 2000-10. 
Figure 5 shows developments in general government balance and debt as a per cent of 
GDP. The trend in general government gross debt has been much more favourable in CESEE 
countries than in non-CESEE OECD countries. The average ratio of debt to GDP has 
decreased by more than 20 percentage points between 2000 and 2008 in CESEE countries, 
whereas it has been stable (or showed just slight decreases) in (other) OECD countries. One 
reason for this development could be differences in budget balances. However, this is 
certainly not the case, since the budget balance6 was better in non-CESEE OECD countries 
than in CESEE countries. Therefore, the two measures described at the beginning of this sub-
section are not perfectly correlated. 
Figure 5. General government balance and gross debt (% GDP), 2000-10 
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Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and EBRD Main macroeconomic indicators. 
The explanation for the divergent trends in debt/GDP ratios is most likely the 
consequence of a highly favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the 
interest rate. As Figure 6 indicates, economic growth in CESEE countries largely exceeded 
                                                     
6. The primary balance is unfortunately not available for several CESEE countries. 
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the interest rate before the crisis, while in (other) OECD countries the two variables broadly 
moved together. The favourable relationship in CESEE countries was supported by financial 
integration (by reducing borrowing costs), higher real GDP growth rates and higher inflation 
rates.7 
Figure 6. Implicit nominal interest rate1 on government debt and nominal GDP growth 
(per cent), 2000-10 
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Note: Interest rate=government interest expenditures/previous year gross debt. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and Eurostat 
website (implicit interest rate). 
3. Fiscal institutions 
This section identifies budgetary institutions which may contribute to aggregate control 
and fiscal discipline, and proposes a new index called “Budgetary Discipline Index”. The 
“Fiscal Institutions Index” of Fabrizio and Mody (2008) and the budgetary institutions 
indexes of Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2007) have motivated the development of this 
Budgetary Discipline Index which nevertheless differs by according more importance to 
different or additional aspects and by omitting some criteria analysed by the previous authors. 
This paper develops a set of institutional features which are considered to be crucial for 
mechanisms of fiscal discipline at the three stages of the budgetary cycle: the preparation 
stage (when the budget is drafted), the authorisation stage (when the budget is approved by 
parliament) and the implementation stage (when the budget is implemented and may be 
amended). The set provides a benchmark for assessing the countries and a basis for 
constructing the Budgetary Discipline Index. 
 
                                                     
7. It should be noted that, during the crisis, the interest rate risk premium has increased and may remain at 
about pre-crisis levels in the coming years, while nominal GDP growth may be squeezed. Therefore, such a 
highly favourable relationship between the growth rate and the interest rate may not return. Also, this paper 
uses the actual implicit interest rate, which is largely determined by past interest rates due to long maturity 
bonds. A rise in spot interest rates will be shown in the implicit interest rates after a lag. 
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3.1. Budget preparation stage 
For the stage of budgetary preparation, three leading parameters contribute to budgetary 
control: fiscal rules, the medium-term expenditure framework and multi-annual expenditure 
estimates. 
3.1.1. Fiscal rules 
According to the definition of a fiscal rule proposed by Kopits and Symanski (1998, 
p. 2), a fiscal rule is “a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an 
indicator of overall fiscal performance. …A critical feature of a fiscal rule is that …it is 
intended for application on a permanent basis by successive governments in a given country.” 
Fiscal rules can serve different goals, and their role in promoting budgetary control 
varies. Depending on how they affect fiscal discipline, the rules are classified as follows:8 
• Expenditure rules usually set permanent or medium-term limits on total, primary or 
current spending in absolute terms, in growth rates, or in per cent of GDP. 
Expenditure rules in their essence include expenditure frameworks with fixed 
ceilings (ceilings that cannot be changed from year to year). Expenditure rules are 
always anchored in a budget balance rule over the cycle (see below). Expenditure 
rules can provide an operational tool to trigger the required fiscal consolidation 
consistent with sustainability. Steering on the expenditure side rather than on a 
cyclically adjusted deficit constraint is more transparent and possibly less susceptible 
to manipulation (Anderson and Minarik, 2006). Therefore, the largest value is 
assigned to expenditure rules. 
• Budget balance rules, which can be set as headline balance and structural (or 
cyclically adjusted) balance, help to ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio converges to a 
finite level. (Sometimes the “balance rule” is referred to as a “deficit rule”.) 
− Headline balance rules have certain disadvantages. The revenue side of the 
budget is almost entirely determined by substantive legislation, namely tax 
legislation, and the expenditure side is partly determined by substantive 
legislation, in particular social security and health legislation (entitlements). This 
means that forecasts for the actual deficit are permanently moving, not only 
during the formulation phase of the budget process but also during the execution 
phase. Focus on the headline balance therefore requires that the budget be 
amended often during both phases of the budget process to react to the latest 
predictions. This hampers an orderly decision-making process and tranquillity in 
the budget numbers. Moreover, it leads to a volatile fiscal stance that changes 
from month to month in the light of the latest forecasts. Budgetary adjustments 
motivated by short-term macroeconomic fluctuations bring a pro-cyclical element 
into budgetary policy and hamper the stabilising effect of the budget (Kraan 
et al., 2006). 
− A structural (or cyclically adjusted) balance rule may solve some issues 
associated with the headline balance rule and improve the trade-off between 
                                                     
8. See IMF (2009) for further details. 
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concerns about sustainability and cyclicality. The cyclically adjusted fiscal 
balance is obtained by removing the cyclical component from the headline fiscal 
balance. The cyclical component, in turn, depends on two factors: the size of the 
output gap; and the output elasticity of the tax yield, which indicates the extent to 
which the tax yield reacts to fluctuations in GDP. However, one disadvantage of 
a cyclically adjusted deficit constraint is that there are arbitrary elements in the 
calculation of the output gap on which the cyclically adjusted deficit is based.9 
Moreover, the concept of the cyclically adjusted balance rule is not always 
transparent to politicians and the public. 
− Some variant of cyclically adjusted balance rules is now used by about 11% of 
countries around the world (IMF, 2009). However, none of the CESEE countries 
have adopted cyclically adjusted balance rules. Concerns about the accuracy of 
calculations might be the main reason for the countries’ abstinence. Given the 
relatively high volatility of macroeconomic variables in the CESEE region, it 
would be difficult to produce an accurate cyclical component. Therefore, this 
paper does not separate structural and headline balance rules, but rather assigns 
them the same score (after expenditure rules). 
• Debt rules set an explicit limit or target for public debt in per cent of GDP. This type 
of rule is, by definition, the most effective in terms of ensuring convergence to a debt 
target. However, it does not provide sufficient guidance for fiscal policy when debt is 
well below its ceiling. Therefore, debt rules score low in the calculation. 
A significant proportion of countries frequently combine balance and debt rules, which 
reflects governments’ preferences for rules with a close link to fiscal sustainability. 
Finally, the absence of a fiscal rule of any kind does not contribute to fiscal discipline; 
thus a zero is assigned to the countries with no fiscal rules. 
3.1.2. Medium-term expenditure framework 
Almost all OECD countries currently work with a medium-term expenditure framework. 
Most of them adjust the framework from year to year in the light of the previous year’s 
outcomes, new estimates of the consequences of current policies and new political priorities. 
This framework can be called a flexible one. The major advantage of a flexible framework in 
comparison to no framework is that, at the time of budget formulation, the multi-annual 
consequences of all changes (setbacks and windfalls on the revenue and expenditure sides, 
and new priorities) have to be traded off against each other and against the adjustment of 
medium-term targets for expenditures, revenues or the deficit. 
A few countries (notably the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have a 
medium-term expenditure framework that is not adjusted from year to year; this can be called 
a fixed framework. It is characteristic for a fixed framework that, during budget formulation, 
all line-item budget numbers and all line-item multi-year estimates have to be squeezed under 
the overall ceiling over the entire term of the framework. The first major advantage of a fixed 
expenditure framework in comparison to no framework is identical to that of a flexible 
framework: all trade-offs have to be considered. A second major advantage is that a fixed 
                                                     
9. See Figure 3 for an example of the uncertainty of output gap estimates. 
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framework is (more) effective than a flexible framework in realising multi-year expenditure 
targets. Precisely because the overall ceiling cannot be changed from year to year, the target is 
automatically realised as long as the framework is maintained. Although only a few OECD 
countries work with a fixed expenditure framework, many others seek to keep their 
expenditure framework as stable as possible from year to year (without formally committing 
to a fixed framework). 
Medium-term expenditure frameworks sometimes contain not only overall ceilings or 
broad sectoral ceilings for central government, local government or the social security funds, 
but also ceilings at the level of ministries or expenditure areas. Ministerial ceilings are 
important because, once established, they impose a certain discipline on ministers and help to 
prevent overspending. 
CESEE countries have also adopted expenditure frameworks in their budgetary process. 
The frameworks are characterised by different degrees of flexibility. For the purposes of this 
paper, the highest score was attributed to the countries that have fixed ceilings for the 
ministries at the very beginning of the budget formulation process and that try to keep them as 
stable as possible from year to year. If a country has targets which may be substantially 
changed and renegotiated during the budget drafting process, the country was given a score of 
zero. 
3.1.3. Multi-annual estimates 
Multi-annual estimates should be integrated into the annual budget to ensure consistency 
with the expenditure framework. Multi-annual line-item estimates on the basis of current 
policy or current law are essential for the allocation of financial resources in the annual 
budget negotiation, and they help to ensure the consistency of current law or policy with the 
multi-annual ceilings. Multi-annual estimates on the basis of current policy or current law 
(“baseline estimates”) should be produced and agreed between the line ministry and the 
finance ministry at least twice a year. Such estimates are an essential tool for budgetary 
discipline not only during budget formulation, but also during budget execution: during 
execution, they alert at an early stage to possible overspending, which may trigger corrective 
measures. 
Establishing the expenditure framework can be seen as a top-down process, and 
preparing budgetary and multi-annual estimates as a bottom-up process. In fact, the 
reconciliation of prescriptive targets or ceilings with descriptive line-item estimates is central 
to a programme-based budget process. Government spending programmes in OECD countries 
have reached such levels of size and complexity that it is frequently difficult to make policy 
changes in the current year that substantially affect the next year’s budget. 
Therefore, the maximum score was attributed to the countries where multi-annual line-
item estimates based on current policy are updated twice or several times per year, a lower 
score to the countries where multi-annual line-item estimates based on current policy are 
available at the start of the budget preparation, and zero to the countries where the estimates 
are prepared on an ad hoc basis or are not produced at all. 
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3.2. Budget authorisation stage (legislation) 
In the legislative stage of the budgetary process, parliament can amend the budget bill 
and either pass or reject it. Two indicators in this second stage are important for promoting 
fiscal discipline: constraints on parliament to amend the budget bill, and independent 
assessment of fiscal policy by a fiscal council. 
3.2.1. Constraints on parliament to amend the budget bill 
The approval stage of the budget cycle serves as an important opportunity for debate of 
the executive’s policy and expenditure priorities. Without intending to study the meaning of 
political representation or the confidence in the legislature held by civil society, the argument 
is that a restricted formal amendment power of parliament contributes to better budgetary 
discipline. If the legislature can only make budget amendments under the condition that the 
budget balance (surplus or deficit) within the executive’s budget proposal is unchanged – or, 
alternatively, if the legislature can only amend downwards any aggregates of expenditure – 
the constraints on the executive budget are maintained and the budgetary cycle is not 
fragmented. This situation will contribute to fiscal discipline. The highest score was attributed 
to countries where the amendment power of parliament is restricted, and a score of zero to the 
countries where the legislature may increase or decrease the level of revenues and/or 
expenditures without the consent of the executive. 
3.2.2. Fiscal councils 
An independent fiscal agency or a fiscal council can help in the formulation and 
implementation of sound fiscal policies. Fiscal councils analyse and assess budgetary 
developments and policies, offer advice, and stimulate public debate and scrutiny while 
leaving the policy mandate with the elected representatives. Fiscal councils can provide 
independent input into the budgetary process and contribute to greater transparency by 
alerting about the political cost of inappropriate policy. 
The desirable form of a fiscal council is specific to each country. The best form depends 
on the nature of a country’s political environment, including the constitutional set-up, the 
legal traditions and the policy-making customs. A fiscal council can complement the role 
played by existing institutions and enhance the effectiveness of fiscal rules (see Debrun, 
Hauner and Kumar, 2009). 
For the analysis in this paper, only fiscal agencies which are fully independent (or a 
nonpartisan government agency) and whose role consists in assessing fiscal policy were 
considered. The premise is that the larger the guarantee of independence from political 
interference, the greater the likelihood of perceived or actual impact on fiscal outcomes. 
 
3.3. Budget implementation stage 
In the third stage, the budget law is executed and further modifications of the law may be 
possible. Two parameters were selected to indicate the level of budgetary control: the rules for 
carryovers of unused funds to the next fiscal year, and the quality of external audit. 
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3.3.1. Carryovers of unused funds 
The issue of carryovers of unused funds to the next fiscal year arises in the stage of 
budgetary execution. Any automatic carryover arrangement, whether cash-based or accruals-
based, will lead to stacks of unused appropriations that will increase from year to year. Any 
general rule limiting carryover will lead to “December fever”. Therefore, the most sensible 
solution is bilateral negotiation between the line minister and the finance minister on a case-
by-case basis. Under a cash regime, each agreed carryover will have to be compensated in the 
next budget year and the finance minister should see to that (Kraan, 2007). Therefore, the 
rules allowing carryovers within certain limits with authorisation of the finance ministry were 
given the highest score, prohibited carryovers were given an average score, and unlimited 
carryover rules (which do not contribute to fiscal discipline) were given a value of zero. 
3.3.2. Quality of external audit 
The quality of external audit is probably the most arbitrary parameter. It encompasses 
various issues related to external audit, namely the openness and availability of audit reports 
to the public, timeliness of such publications, the nature of audit reports (for instance, 
performance audit reports are considered as a more advanced level of auditing with greater 
outcomes than compliance reports), the mechanism provided for follow-up measures, and 
some other criteria which can differ depending on countries’ circumstances. Therefore, the 
countries with both financial and performance audits complemented by strong mechanisms 
for follow-up measures score high in the ranking. A focus on financial audit and/or 
insufficient use of audit reports indicates an insufficient level of development of audit 
institutions (zero score). 
 
3.4. Design of the index 
Table 1 provides an overview of the design of the Budgetary Discipline Index and 
indicates the preferred weights. 
It should be kept in mind that the study looks at budgetary institutions from the 
perspective of how well they contribute to the fulfilment of one particular function of the 
budget: control of spending, taxation and borrowing. Therefore, other functions of the budget 
– namely the efficient allocation of resources, the cost-efficient management of spending 
programmes, the democratic authorisation of and accountability for taxation, spending and 
borrowing – are not considered. This focus determines the set of variables in the construction 
of the Budgetary Discipline Index. Institutional characteristics that promote co-ordinated and 
cohesive decision making are expected to be more conducive to fiscal discipline and therefore 
receive a higher score in the quantitative index used for the empirical analysis. 
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Table 1. Construction of the Budgetary Discipline Index: index parameters 
 Index Sub-
index 
Numerica
l coding 
Budget preparation 0.50   
Fiscal rules  0.50  
Expenditure rule   4.00 
Budget balance rule   2.67 
Debt rule   1.33 
None   0.00 
Medium-term expenditure framework  0.25  
Multi-annual ceilings are decided at the start of the budget 
preparation. 
  4.00 
No framework or ceilings may be substantially and frequently 
changed during the budget preparation. 
  0.00 
Multi-annual line-item expenditure estimates  0.25  
Multi-annual estimates based on current policy are updated twice 
or several times per year. 
  4.00 
Multi-annual estimates based on current policy are available at 
the start of the budget preparation. 
  2.00 
There are no multi-annual estimates based on current policy.   0.00 
Budget authorisation 0.25   
Constraints on parliament to amend the budget bill  0.50  
Amendments leading to spending increases or decreases of tax 
revenue are required to be offset by savings or tax increases. 
  4.00 
No constraints.   0.00 
Fiscal council  0.50  
There is a fiscal council to assess fiscal policies independently.   4.00 
No fiscal council.   0.00 
Budget implementation 0.25   
Carryover of unused funds to the next fiscal year  0.50  
Allowed within certain limits with authorisation of the finance 
ministry. 
  4.00 
Not permitted.   2.00 
Unlimited.   0.00 
Quality of external audit  0.50  
Financial and performance audits with detailed scrutiny 
completed by strong mechanisms for follow-up measures. 
  4.00 
Focus on financial audit and/or insufficient use of audit reports.   0.00 
Note: By constriction, the index can take values between zero and four. 
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3.5. Data 
Limited availability of data on CESEE countries restricts the research, and the major 
concern is that the data do not always contain enough information to enable solid conclusions 
to be drawn. Two main sources have been used: OECD budget reviews 
(www.oecd.org/gov/budget) and the OECD International Budget Practices and Procedures 
Database 2007/08 (www.oecd.org/gov/budget/database). 
The objective of the budget reviews is to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
budget process in the country under examination, to evaluate national experiences in the light 
of international best practice and to provide specific policy recommendations, as well as to 
offer other countries an opportunity to comment on specific budgeting issues in the country 
under examination (“peer review”).10 The reviews look at the budget institutions or the rules 
of the budget process and the way they function. Therefore, the budget reviews provided the 
required facts and analyses of institutional features in CESEE countries. 
The International Budget Practices and Procedures Database is a database maintained 
by the OECD.11 Therefore, the Budgetary Discipline Index calculated here is a snapshot of the 
situation between 2007 and 2008. The index does not reflect emerging trends or reforms since 
2008, or the general economic slowdown. For instance, all the progress achieved in such 
countries as Hungary (introduction of advanced fiscal rules and a fiscal council) is not 
reflected in this paper. 
3.6. Results 
On the basis of the premises and parameters discussed in the previous sub-section, a 
quantitative Budgetary Discipline Index was constructed for 20 CESEE countries for which 
data were available: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. For comparative 
reasons, the same indices were created for OECD countries. Figures 7 and 8 show the overall 
index for CESEE and OECD countries12 (the OECD countries do not include the ones which 
are also CESEE countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey). 
Tables 2 and 3 detail the calculations. 
                                                     
10. The following countries have been reviewed: Romania and Slovenia in 2005; Croatia, Georgia and Hungary 
in 2006; Turkey in 2007; Estonia and the Russian Federation in 2008; Bulgaria and Latvia in 2009, 
Lithuania and Moldova in 2010. 
11. It contains among other things the results of the 2007 OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in 
OECD countries and the 2008 World Bank/OECD survey of budget practices and procedures in Asia and 
other regions. Information on budget institutions from 97 countries is available including the 31 OECD 
member countries and 66 non-member countries. The data refer to the years 2007 and 2008. 
12. Estonia and Slovenia were not member countries of the OECD in 2008, but joined the Organisation later. 
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Figure 7. Budgetary Discipline Index for CESEE countries (2007/08) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD budget reviews and the OECD International Budget Practices 
and Procedures Database. 
Figure 8. Budgetary Discipline Index for non-CESEE OECD countries (2007/08) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD budget reviews and the OECD International Budget Practices 
and Procedures Database. 
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Among CESEE countries, there is a relatively large disparity in terms of scores. Globally, 
EU member countries have higher scores than non EU members, with the notable exception 
of Romania scoring relatively low. Slovenia, Estonia and Malta had the strongest budgetary 
institutions at the time. Overall, countries which adopted fiscal rules score the highest in the 
ranking. 
By comparing the indices of CESEE countries (Figure 7) with the indices of OECD 
countries (Figure 8), the OECD indices appear to be generally higher, and the average index 
among OECD countries (2.7) is significantly higher than the average index in CESEE 
countries (2.2). However, there is a relatively large heterogeneity among OECD countries as 
well, and some OECD countries – namely the United States, Australia, Norway, Belgium and 
Switzerland – show relatively low rates. 
The low scores in some OECD countries might be due to the fact that this paper looks at 
the legal framework of a country (at the central level) and coalition agreements to examine the 
presence and the nature of fiscal rules and expenditure frameworks. The fact that some 
countries (for example, Australia, Norway or the United States) have long-standing customs 
which are not necessarily reflected in the legislation is not taken into consideration. 
Therefore, even if these countries have no legal provisions regarding fiscal control measures, 
they may have other strong tools to promote aggregated budgetary control. 
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4. Monetary institutions 
Four measures of monetary institutions are used: 
• exchange rate regime 
• central bank independence 
• central bank transparency 
• financial regulation and supervision 
The importance of these factors and their relation to monetary institutions are explained 
in the following sub-sections. 
4.1. Exchange rate regime 
The nature of the exchange rate regime is the dominant determinant of monetary 
institutions. Table 4 indicates a wide diversity of exchange rate regimes, both across countries 
and over time. It is interesting to observe that sometimes even countries with similar 
circumstances often opted for different regimes: for example, the Czech Republic (float) and 
Slovakia (euro); Romania (float) and Bulgaria (currency boards); Serbia and Albania (float) 
and the other four western Balkan countries (various kinds of fixed exchange rates). This 
diversity suggests that it could be quite difficult to identify the reasons behind exchange rate 
regime choices apart from, for example, market-forced exit from pegs such as the move of the 
Czech Republic in 1997, the Russian Federation in 1998, Turkey in 2002, or Ukraine in late 
2008. 
Another interesting observation is the disappearance of intermediate regimes. While in 
the 1990s several countries adopted crawling or horizontal bands, these regimes have passed, 
and there are more countries with either (more or less) freely floating exchange rate regimes 
or currency pegs. This finding is in line with global trends. Yet it is also important to note 
that, while several countries moved from a peg to a float, only two countries so far have 
moved in the opposite direction (Bulgaria and Slovakia). Finally, it is also interesting to 
observe that even neighbouring countries move away from United States dollar pegs. 
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Table 4. Exchange rate arrangements in CESEE countries, 1996-2009 
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Romania
Slovenia
Albania
Bosnia and 
Hercegovina
Croatia
Macedonia, FYR
Montenegro
Serbia
Turkey
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
E
U
 m
em
b
er
s
E
U
 c
an
d
id
at
es
Floating
Peg to USD Crawling band/managed against the RUB, later USD as well Basket
Euro
Peg to a basket of ECU/Euro, USD, and GBP ERM-II, narrow band Euro
Currency board to USD
P
eg
 €
Czeh Rep.
70%ECU 70% DM
70% 
EUR
Crawling band, +/-2.25%, 
30%USD&:
Hungary
ECU/Euro peg
20031996
+-15%
EUR band
2006 200720012000 2008
Currency 
board, DM
Band65%D
M,35%USD
+/- 7.5%
Floating
Currency board to 
EUR
Currency board to 
EUR
Peg to SDR, +/- 1% ERM-II +/-1%
Crawling 
band, EUR
+/-2.25%
ERM-II, narrow band
+/-7%
Floating
Floating
Currency board to DM 
Peg or de facto peg to USD
Managed foating, de facto peg or crawling peg to DM/Euro
USD Floating
1997 1998
Peg DM
Managed floating Managed foating, de facto peg to EUR
Euroization
de facto peg to the DM/EUR
ERM-II narrow band
55% EUR, 
45% USD
2005
ERM-II, Currency board
Floating
Floating
Currency board to DM
Floating
ERM-II, Currency board
1999 2002 2004
Euro
Floating (1992.07. - )
Currency board to Euro
Poland
Crawling band
+/- 
10%
+/-
12.
5%
+/-15%
+/-3%
45% USD, 35% DM, 10% 
GBP, 5% FFR, 5% CHF
Slovakia
ERM-II +/-15%, de facto 
float with revaluations
EuroFloating
60% DM, 40% USD band
+-7%+/-5%
2009
Currency board, EUR
Euro Float
Peg/band 
to DM/Euro
ERM-II
Peg/band 
to USD
Peg/band 
to a basket
Peg DM  Managed floating
Crawling peg to a basked Peg to a basket Floating
Managed floating
N
ei
g
h
b
o
u
rh
o
o
d
Peg to USD Crawling peg
Euro-dollar 
basket
Peg to USD
 
Sources: For EU member states: updated from Szapáry (2009). For other countries: IMF and central bank 
reports. 
Have exchange rate regimes played a role in macroeconomic developments? Table 5 
presents rough evidence that they may have. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes had 
higher macroeconomic volatility, larger current account deficits, higher inflation, faster credit 
growth, and a higher share of finance and real estate sectors in FDI inflows. 
For catching-up economies, the adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes carries a risk 
(see, for example, Darvas and Szapáry, 2008). When the exchange rate is fixed, price level 
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convergence – which accompanies economic catching-up – translates into higher inflation. (In 
floating exchange rate countries, nominal exchange rate appreciation can also accommodate 
price level convergence.) But when the exchange rate peg is credible, nominal interest rates 
decline, and borrowers are also more willing to take foreign currency loans because they do 
not observe the exchange rate risk. But higher inflation and low interest rates (either domestic 
currency interest rates, or foreign currency interest rates) fuel credit booms which can lead to 
real estate booms and overheating of the economy, which in turn raise inflation above its 
equilibrium value, leading to a vicious circle. All these factors can lead to a misallocation of 
capital and labour. 
Table 5. Exchange rate regimes and main macroeconomic developments 
 GDP 
volatility 
Current 
account 
balance/GDP 
(%), 2008 
Inflation
, 
2008 
Credit/GDP: 
% change 
from 2004 to 
2008 
Foreign direct investment to 
finance and real estate 
sectors 
(% of total FDI), 2007 
Floaters 3.7 -7.8 7.8 20 26 
Fixers 4.7 -12.3 11.1 36 40 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the IMF (first four indicators) and wiiw 
(sectoral composition of FDI). 
However, it also has to be emphasised that a floating exchange rate regime is not a 
panacea. For example, Hungary (a floating exchange rate country) was the first to turn to the 
IMF for help after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Romania and Serbia, two other floating 
rate countries, also had to rely on an IMF financing programme. Therefore, while the 
evidence in Table 5 is telling, other factors should be at work in addition to the exchange rate 
regime. 
4.2. Central bank independence 
Central bank independence is an important metric of monetary institutions. In a seminal 
work, Kydland and Prescott (1977) developed a model of the so-called time inconsistency 
problem. Central bankers not isolated from political pressures would have ended up running 
inflationary policies without being able to boost the economy, which probably characterised a 
couple of central banks in the 1970s when inflation was high and growth was low in advanced 
countries. Solutions to the problem of time inconsistency were offered by Rogoff (1985) and 
Walsh (1995): either hiring a central banker who is strongly opposed to inflation or giving the 
central banker incentives to keep inflation as low as possible. Since then, a consensus has 
developed that the central bank’s management has to be isolated from the government. 
The literature has developed ways to measure central bank independence. This paper uses 
the index developed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) which has been updated by 
Crowe and Meade (2007). Unfortunately, the most recent year for which this index is 
available is 2003. Figures 9 and 10 below show the 2003 value in comparison to the average 
of 1980-99 whenever available. CESEE countries rank reasonably well along this metric, and 
most of them have even more independent central banks than non-CESEE OECD countries. 
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Figure 9. Central bank independence in CESEE countries 
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Source: Crowe and Meade (2007) 
Figure 10. Central bank independence in non-CESEE OECD countries 
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Source: Crowe and Meade (2007) 
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4.3. Central bank transparency 
In addition to central bank independence, central bank transparency also plays an 
important role in improving monetary policy making. A major change in conduct of monetary 
policy over the last twenty years has been improvements in transparency (Dincer and 
Eichengreen, 2007, 2009; Geraats, 2006, 2008, 2009). Transparency of monetary policy refers 
to the absence of information asymmetries between monetary policy makers and the private 
sector. A higher degree in transparency should allow economic agents to interpret central 
bank policies and hence to better align their decisions with those of the central bank and 
forecast more accurately the time path of relevant variables. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) 
have shown that a higher degree of transparency seems to be positively correlated with the 
higher level of stability of a country and with a more advanced stage of development of 
financial markets. 
This study uses the index developed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). Figure 11 shows 
the transparency index for 2000 and 2006. Improvements can be observed in some CESEE 
countries, but several of these countries still have a large gap compared to OECD countries 
(Figure 12). 
Figure 11. Central bank transparency in CESEE countries 
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Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) 
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Figure 12. Central bank transparency in non-CESEE OECD countries 
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Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) 
Figures 13 and 14 reveal that central bank transparency correlates well with both the 
2009 GDP developments and the GDP volatility during 2000-10. 
Figure 13. Central bank transparency versus GDP growth in 2009 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) and IMF World Economic 
Outlook April 2010. 
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Figure 14. Central bank transparency versus GDP volatility 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) and IMF World Economic 
Outlook April 2010. 
4.4. Financial regulation and supervision 
Financial regulation and supervision are crucial elements of the macroeconomic policy 
mix, and essential complements to monetary policy. The crisis has indicated that the 
combination of lax monetary policy with lax financial regulation and supervision may lead to 
financial excesses and unsustainable booms. 
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to measure the “quality” of financial regulation 
because it has so many dimensions (see, for example, Hilbers et al., 2005). Also, in an 
integrated market, domestic financial regulation may not be very effective after all. On 
average, 70% of the domestic banking systems in CESEE countries are owned by mostly 
western European banking groups (Berglöf et al., 2009) and, under free capital mobility, 
domestic regulations could be circumvented. 
A set of indicators to measure regulation and supervision has been developed by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2008). Figures 15 and 16 report their results. On average, CESEE 
countries do not lag behind OECD countries, though there is heterogeneity within the region; 
and while some countries improved from 2003 to 2007, others fell behind. 
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Figure 15. Quality of financial regulation and supervision in CESEE countries 
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Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) 
Figure 16. Quality of financial regulation and supervision in non-CESEE OECD 
countries 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ja
pa
n
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s
A
us
tr
al
ia
K
or
ea
M
ex
ic
o
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
S
w
itz
er
la
nd
D
en
m
ar
k
E
ur
o
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
Ic
el
an
d
C
an
ad
a
S
w
ed
en
2003
2007
 
Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) 
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However, the assessment of financial regulation and supervision is complicated by the 
fact that the lack of strict financial regulation has led to unsustainable credit booms in certain 
countries, but not in others. These differing outcomes could most likely be explained by the 
appropriateness of other elements of the macroeconomic policy mix. To put it another way, 
one cannot claim that the lack of strict regulation and supervision was a policy mistake. One 
can only claim that it was a likely policy mistake in countries in which credit growth reached 
extraordinarily high levels. Not surprisingly, the pre-crisis speed of credit growth correlates 
strongly with pre-crisis current account imbalances and also with output falls in 2009 in 
CESEE countries, as Figure 17 indicates. The correlation in non-CESEE OECD countries is 
weaker, but this is not surprising since there were just a few non-CESEE OECD countries that 
followed a growth model similar to that of CESEE countries, like the Mediterranean euro area 
members. The correlation of pre-crisis credit growth and GDP volatility reveals a similar 
relationship (Figure 18). 
Figure 17. Credit growth in 2004-07 versus GDP growth in 2009 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and International 
Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 18. Credit growth in 2004-07 versus GDP volatility 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and International 
Financial Statistics 
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For the reasons previously discussed, this paper uses both the index derived by Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2008) and the actual speed of credit growth from 2003 to 2007 as a proxy 
of proper regulation and supervision. 
 
5. Econometric analysis 
Having established certain measures of fiscal and monetary institutions in the previous 
sections, this section presents formal econometric models for studying the impact of these 
institutions on macroeconomic stability and budgetary control.  
 
5.1. Macroeconomic stability 
As indicated in Section 2.2, two measures of macroeconomic stability are used for the 
econometric analysis: volatility of GDP growth rates (for two periods: 2000-07 and 2000-10) 
and output decline in 2009. The regression framework adopted is the following: 
(1)  iiii
y
i controlsinstfiscinstmon νδγβασ +′+++= ....)log(  
 
(2)  iiii controlsinstfiscinstmony νδγβα +′+++=∆ ....2009  
 
where )log( yiσ  denotes the logarithm of GDP volatility (a logarithmic transformation is 
adopted in order to ensure that the fitted volatility will be positive), 2009y∆  denotes the real 
change in GDP in 2009, iinstmon ..  denotes a measure of monetary institutions, iinstfisc ..  
denotes a measure of fiscal institutions, icontrols  denotes a set of control variables, and iν  
denotes the error term. Cross-section regressions are run, and therefore there is no time 
dimension in the regression. 
For fiscal institutions, the Budgetary Discipline Index is used. For monetary institutions, 
the four indicators discussed in Section 4 are used: exchange rate regime; central bank 
independence;13 central bank transparency; and financial regulation and supervision, as well 
as credit growth (which is used as a proxy for financial regulation and supervision). In 
addition, various controls have been used that can impact macroeconomic volatility: volatility 
of terms of trade, trade openness, GDP per capita, government expenditures/GDP, debt/GDP, 
pre-crisis speed of credit growth, and the overall institutional quality index of the World 
Economic Forum.14 
                                                     
13. For the first 12 members of the euro area, central bank transparency relates to the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Countries in the euro area have been excluded because of the large divergences within the euro area 
in terms of various indicators, including fiscal ones. 
14. The “Quality of Institutions Index” of the World Economic Forum is the average of 19 sub-indices: property 
rights, intellectual property protection, diversion of public funds, public trust of politicians, judicial 
independence, favouritism in decisions of government officials, wastefulness of government spending, 
burden of government regulation, efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes, efficiency of legal 
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Table 6 shows the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation results. The columns of the 
table correspond to different regressions. The rows of the table indicate the variables included 
in a particular regression. Two equations are presented for each indicator: one without 
controls and one controlling for GDP per capita (since poorer countries used to show more 
output volatility) and trade openness (since more open countries used to be more volatile). 
Other possible control variables did not prove to be significant. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
framework in challenging regulations, transparency of government policy making, business costs of 
terrorism, business costs of crime and violence, organised crime, reliability of police services, ethical 
behaviour of firms, strength of auditing and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards, and protection 
of minority shareholders’ interests. 
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for GDP volatility 
A. Dependent variable is GDP volatility in 2000-07 
expected 
sign A B C B E F G H I J K L M
- BDI -0.13 0.00
  t-ratio -1.1 0.0
? FIXED 0.05 -0.16
  t-ratio 0.4 -1.2
- CBI 0.10 -0.23
  t-ratio 0.3 -0.8
- CBT -0.048 0.003 0.007
  t-ratio -1.9 0.1 0.2
- R&S -0.050 -0.058
  t-ratio -0.6 -0.9
+ CREDIT 0.0003 0.0010 0.0018
  t-ratio 0.2 0.5 1.3
- GDP per Cap -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009
  t-ratio -3.6 -4.3 -4.0 -2.8 -2.8 -4.4 -3.1
+ Trade open 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000
  t-ratio 2.7 3.2 2.8 0.2 2.4 2.7 0.1
R2bar 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.35 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.32 0.38
Nobs 45 44 51 49 44 43 34 33 39 38 51 49 33  
B. Dependent variable is GDP volatility in 2000-10 
expected 
sign A B C B E F G H I J K L M
- BDI -0.11 0.06
  t-ratio -1.1 0.8
? FIXED 0.19 0.05
  t-ratio 1.5 0.4
- CBI 0.61 0.30
  t-ratio 2.3 1.4
- CBT -0.087 -0.035 -0.029
  t-ratio -4.2 -1.8 -1.5
- R&S -0.124 -0.105
  t-ratio -1.4 -1.4
+ CREDIT 0.0019 0.0029 0.0026
  t-ratio 1.9 4.3 4.4
- GDP per Cap -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010
  t-ratio -4.6 -5.0 -3.8 -3.0 -3.9 -5.7 -3.7
+ Trade open 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001
  t-ratio 3.7 3.3 3.5 0.9 3.0 3.2 0.7
R2bar 0.02 0.37 0.04 0.38 0.08 0.33 0.28 0.48 0.05 0.38 0.02 0.43 0.53
Nobs 45 45 51 50 44 44 34 34 39 39 51 50 34  
 
C. Dependent variable is GDP growth in 2009 
expected 
sign A B C B E F G H I J K L M
+ BDI 0.02 -0.96
  t-ratio 0.0 -1.2
? FIXED -1.13 -0.67
  t-ratio -0.9 -0.5
+ CBI -5.72 -4.98
  t-ratio -2.2 -1.9
+ CBT 0.62 0.47 0.43
  t-ratio 2.7 2.2 2.1
+ R&S 0.867 0.771
  t-ratio 1.0 0.9
- CREDIT -0.019 -0.022 -0.017
  t-ratio -1.9 -2.2 -2.0
+ GDP per Cap 0.048 0.021 0.011 0.023 0.041 0.028 0.030
  t-ratio 2.5 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.8 1.3 1.1
- Trade open -0.024 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.019 -0.012 -0.011
  t-ratio -2.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.6 -1.6 -1.3 -0.5
R2bar 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.19
Nobs 45 45 51 50 44 44 34 34 39 39 51 50 34  
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Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the standard deviation of annual GDP growth rates between 
2000 and 2010 (Panel A) and between 2000 and 2010 (Panel B); the 2009 real GDP growth rate is the dependent 
variable in Panel C. 
BDI: Budgetary Discipline Index; FIXED: fixed exchange rate (all euro area members are classified as having a 
fixed exchange rate); CBI: Central bank independence; CBT: Central bank transparency; R&S: Financial 
regulation and supervision; CREDIT: change in credit/GDP from 2004 to 2008. Constant is also included in the 
regression; heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used; the t-ratios are shown below the parameter 
estimates. Parameter estimates that are statistically significant (at least at the 10% level) are in bold. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Considering volatility during the pre-crisis period, practically none of the indicators are 
significant.15 However, Section 2 above argued that considering the pre-crisis period only is 
misleading, because the seemingly smooth development of CESEE countries has in fact led to 
the build-up of various vulnerabilities. It is much more preferable to include the bust phase of 
the business cycle as well. 
Indeed, Panels B and C do indicate that countries with better monetary institutions tended 
to have less GDP volatility. In particular, lower output volatility is associated with more 
transparent central banks and lower pre-crisis credit growth, and these results are robust to 
various controls (see columns H and L). Including both variables along with the controls (see 
column M) does not change the results much: both variables continue to be significant. 
Central bank independence is significant only when other controls are not considered, 
though this variable is significant at the level of 11% when the 2009 growth is considered. 
The parameter estimate of financial regulation and supervision is correct, but this variable is 
not significant (columns I and J). Countries with fixed exchange rates tend to have more 
volatile business cycles, but the parameter estimate is not significant (columns C and D). 
Central bank transparency explains about one-third of the variation in the dependent 
variable and, when combined with GDP per capita and trade openness, explain more than 
one-half of the cross-sectional variation of GDP volatility in 2000-10. 
Finally, the Budgetary Discipline Index (see columns A and B) does not have a 
significant parameter estimate, and in some cases even the point estimate of the parameter has 
an incorrect sign. There might be two reasons why the premise that better fiscal institutions 
can dampen macroeconomic volatility did not prove true. First, not all parameters used in the 
construction of the Budgetary Discipline Index are important for macroeconomic 
stabilisation. In fact, institutions that foster stabilisation (expenditure rules or a medium-term 
expenditure framework) were often overwhelmed by some other features used in the index 
design. Thus the index is not fully adapted to testing the influence on macroeconomic 
volatility. 
Second, the design of the Budgetary Discipline Index is tailored to CESEE countries and 
takes into consideration specific circumstances of the region. A number of parameters which 
could also be important for fostering macroeconomic stabilisation (for instance, structural 
balance rule and not just headline balance rule, and the existence of compensation 
requirements in case of overspending) are not considered in the index construction because 
                                                     
15. The only exception is central bank transparency when controls are not included. 
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they do not exist or are not frequent in the region. This focus on specific regional 
circumstances may have impaired the confirmation of the hypothesis, but obviously also 
reflects real facts (namely the absence of institutions that may be particularly relevant for 
stabilisation, which lends plausibility to the research result). 
 
5.2. Fiscal outcomes 
This sub-section studies the impact of the Budgetary Discipline Index on fiscal outcomes: 
on government debt and balance developments. As argued in Section 2.3, the study regresses 
the change in the debt/GDP ratio and not the level of that ratio, because current fiscal 
institutions do not have an impact on the inherited stock of debt which largely determines the 
actual level of debt.16 Of course, the study controls for the initial level of debt (by including 
the debt level of 2000) because countries with higher debt/GDP ratios may make more efforts 
to reduce their debt. The study also controls for the interest rate/GDP growth rate differential 
because, as argued in Section 2.3, this differential had a significant impact on debt 
developments. These controls are included in every regression. Other control variables are 
also added one by one: overall institutional quality, the four measures of monetary 
institutions, and GDP volatility. Therefore, the regression has the following form: 
 
(3)  ( ) ii
i
ii
i
controls
DDP
debt
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debt
νδβββα +′+




+−++=




∆
,2000
321  
 
The following parameter signs would be in line with our priors: 01<β  (better fiscal 
institutions decrease the debt/GDP ratio), 02>β  (lower interest rate and faster growth reduce 
the debt/GDP ratio) and 03<β  (higher initial debt/GDP level may induce efforts to cut 
decrease ratio). The expected sign of the control parameters varies. A negative parameter is 
expected for the overall institutional quality and monetary institutions (better institutions lead 
to a fall in debt), while a positive parameter is expected for GDP volatility (higher volatility 
makes it more difficult to reduce the debt). The key results are shown in Table 7. 
                                                     
16. The historical developments of fiscal institutions likely have an impact on historical debt developments. If 
fiscal institutions are persistent, then past fiscal institutions can impact both current fiscal institutions and 
current debt levels. However, even in this case current fiscal institutions likely impact the change in debt; 
therefore, the regression is correct in this case. Furthermore, fiscal institutions change in time, which further 
calls for the analysis of the change in debt and not in the level of debt. 
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Table 7. Regression of change in debt/GDP on Budgetary Discipline Index 
expected 
sign
OECD + 
CESEE
OECD + 
CESEE
CESEE 
only
CESEE 
only
OECD + 
CESEE
OECD + 
CESEE
CESEE 
only
CESEE 
only
- BDI 2.0 2.4 -8.3 -12.9 9.6 10.0 -28.3 -33.2
t-ratio 0.2 0.3 -1.0 -1.4 0.8 0.9 -2.8 -3.5
+ Int.rate - GDP growth 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.2 2.9 2.4 3.2 2.9
t-ratio 5.5 4.4 6.0 4.7 2.9 1.9 5.6 4.1
- Debt/GDP in 2000 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.9
t-ratio -0.9 -0.7 -5.0 -3.1 -0.5 -0.3 -4.3 -3.1
- Institutional quality -1.2 7.2 -0.6 7.3
t-ratio -0.4 1.3 -0.1 0.9
R2bar 0.41 0.30 0.83 0.79 0.30 0.22 0.78 0.73
Nobs 41 40 17 16 41 40 17 16
Dependent variable: change in debt/GDP 
from 2000 to 2007
Dependent variable: change in debt/GDP 
from 2000 to 2010
 
Notes: BDI: Budgetary Discipline Index. Constant is also included in the regression; heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are used; the t-ratios are shown below the parameter estimates. Parameter estimates that are 
statistically significant (at least at the 10% level) are in bold. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The Budgetary Discipline Index is not significant for the combined sample of OECD and 
CESEE countries, but this result is due to the inclusion of OECD countries. When the sample 
is restricted to CESEE countries only, the point estimate is negative as expected, and the 
results are highly significant when considering the 2000-10 sample. It has already been 
argued that the 2000-10 sample is preferable to the 2000-07 sample. 
The interest rate/growth rate differential is highly significant with a proper positive 
coefficient in all regressions, and the initial level of debt is highly significant with a proper 
negative sign for the CESEE countries. 
A couple of additional control variables have been included. First, we controlled for the 
overall institutional quality, because we have found that countries with better overall 
institutions tend to have better budgetary institutions as well. However, as Table 7 reveals, the 
BDI variable continues to be significant when controlling for the overall institutional quality, 
while this latter variable is not significant (and even contradictory has a positive point 
estimate). Second, we controlled for all four measures of monetary institutions (we have 
added them to the equation one by one) to see whether they have an impact on debt 
developments: none of the four indicators had a significant parameter estimate. Third, we also 
controlled for macroeconomic stability, but again, this variable turned out to be insignificant. 
The BDI variable retained its significantly negative estimate (for the CESEE sample) when 
using any of these additional control variables. Therefore, a higher BDI implies a fall in debt, 
and this result is robust to various controls. 
The poor results of the index for the OECD countries can be explained by the existence 
of some outliers like Japan (highest BDI and debt) or Norway (low BDI and low debt) with 
country-specific circumstances. Moreover, the parameters selected for designing the index are 
rather tailored to the CESEE area and do not reflect a number of nuances characteristic for 
advanced countries. Therefore, it can impair the index results for the OECD area. 
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Regarding the estimates for the average budget balance, the explanatory variables are 
identical to the debt regressions: 
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The expected result is exactly the opposite parameter signs to the debt regressions – that 
is, 01>γ , 02<γ  and 03>γ  – and the expected parameter signs of the control variables are also 
the opposite. The main results are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Regression of average balance/GDP on Budgetary Discipline Index 
expected 
sign
OECD + 
CESEE
OECD + 
CESEE
CESEE 
only
CESEE 
only
OECD + 
CESEE
OECD + 
CESEE
CESEE 
only
CESEE 
only
+ BDI 0.4 -0.9 4.9 5.1 0.0 -1.0 4.5 4.5
t-ratio 0.3 -0.7 5.7 4.6 0.0 -0.8 5.5 4.8
- Int.rate - GDP growth -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
t-ratio -1.2 -2.8 -10.9 -8.2 -1.2 -2.5 -8.7 -7.5
+ Debt/GDP in 2000 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03
t-ratio -1.94 -0.81 1.03 1.19 -1.98 -1.00 0.82 1.04
+ Institutional quality 2.8 0.2 2.6 0.4
t-ratio 3.6 0.3 3.2 0.6
R2bar 0.11 0.48 0.77 0.78 0.10 0.46 0.66 0.68
Nobs 41 40 17 16 41 40 17 16
Dependent variable: average balance from 
2000 to 2007
Dependent variable: average balance from 
2000 to 2010
 
Notes: BDI: Budgetary Discipline Index. Constant is also included in the regression; heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are used; the t-ratios are shown below the parameter estimates. Parameter estimates that are 
statistically significant (at least at the 10% level) are in bold. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In general, the results are similar to the results obtained for the debt regression, though 
there are important differences. The Budgetary Discipline Index is not significant for the 
combined sample of OECD and CESEE countries, but is significant, with a proper sign, for 
the CESEE sample. The results are now significant for both time periods. The interest 
rate/growth rate differential is significant with a proper parameter sign, but the initial debt 
level is not significant.17 
                                                     
17. Considering the other controls: overall institutional quality is significant (with a proper positive parameter) 
for the OECD countries, but not for the CESEE countries; the four monetary institutional variables have 
properly signed parameter estimates, but are generally not significant (the most significant variable is central 
bank independence, which is significant at a 10 percent level). When considering the CESEE sample, the 
Budgetary Discipline Index remained highly significant when adding any of these control variables, and 
therefore these regressions also underline that better fiscal institutions lead to better fiscal outcomes. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper studied the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability 
and budgetary control. To this end, a new index of budgetary discipline was created (using 
available data from 2007/08) which combines rules and procedures for the three main stages 
of budgeting: the preparation stage (when the budget is drafted), the authorisation stage (when 
the budget is approved by parliament) and the implementation stage (when the budget is 
implemented and may be amended). For monetary institutions, four indicators were studied: 
the type of exchange rate regime, an index of central bank independence, an index of central 
bank transparency, and an index of financial regulation and supervision. Since the latter 
suffers from deficiencies, the pre-crisis speed of credit growth has been used as a proxy for 
proper financial regulation and supervision. 
This paper studied the impact of these indicators on macroeconomic stability and 
budgetary control. It has been noted that CESEE countries tend to grow faster (or at least 
tended to grow faster before the crisis) and have more volatile growth than non-CESEE 
OECD countries. This phenomenon has implications for macroeconomic management. More 
volatile output developments lead to more volatile budget revenues, and expenditures (both 
through automatic stabilisers and possibly through discretionary stimulus) are also expected 
to be more volatile. In the absence of sound fiscal institutions, this could lead to pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy. Indeed, using structural vector-autoregressions, Darvas (2010) found that fiscal 
policy was pro-cyclical in most CESEE countries (with a few exceptions). This calls for 
strong fiscal institutions. Yet the Budgetary Discipline Index suggests that fiscal institutions 
are considerably weaker in several CESEE countries than in non-CESEE OECD countries. 
Therefore, there is significant room for improvement in most countries. 
The recent global financial and economic crisis hit CESEE countries harder than other 
emerging country regions of the world. Recovery from the crisis is also slower. These 
developments raise question marks about the pre-crisis development model of the region, 
which was largely based on institutional, financial and trade integration with the EU and was 
accompanied by substantial labour mobility. Recent research suggests that the good features 
of this model should be preserved, but several CESEE countries have to implement significant 
changes to this economic model in a much less benign domestic and international 
environment. Economic growth will likely fall substantially behind pre-crisis economic 
growth trends.  
It has been shown that the general decline in government debt/GDP ratios of most 
CESEE countries before the crisis was the consequence of a highly favourable relationship 
between economic growth and the interest rate: economic growth well exceeded the interest 
rate. Therefore, government debt/GDP ratios fell in CESEE countries but not in non-CESEE 
OECD countries, even though the budget balance was better in the non-CESEE OECD group. 
Since growth will likely slow down and interest rates will rise after the crisis, a less 
favourable relationship is expected between the growth rate and the interest rate which also 
calls for enhanced budgetary frameworks. 
By comparing the budgetary discipline indices of CESEE countries with the indices of 
OECD countries, the latter appear to be generally higher, and the average index among OECD 
countries is significantly higher than the average index in CESEE countries. However, there is 
a relatively large heterogeneity among OECD countries as well. 
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The final part of the paper used econometric models for studying the impact of fiscal and 
monetary institutions on macroeconomic stability and fiscal outcomes. Some evidence was 
found that better monetary institutions dampen macroeconomic volatility. But the hypothesis 
that better fiscal institutions promote macroeconomic stability could not be confirmed. This 
result can possibly be explained by the fact that various parameters which are important for 
macroeconomic stability have only weak impact on the index values. Moreover, the index is 
specifically tailored to the CESEE region and therefore omits some important characteristics 
which are frequent in advanced countries but do not exist in CESEE countries. When 
controlling for the difference between interest rate and growth rate and initial level of debt, 
the Budgetary Discipline Index significantly explains debt and balance developments in 
CESEE countries: countries with a higher index had a smaller increase in the debt/GDP ratio 
and better budget balances. This result was robust to the inclusion of several control variables, 
including an indicator of overall institutional quality. All of these results call for better 
budgetary procedures and improved monetary frameworks. 
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